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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Problen of Political Repression
Concern with the functions and processes of the polity
has long been an area of study (e.g.* Levine and Cornwell*
1972* Drum* 19781. This is understandable given the far-
reaching consequences of government in society. However*
there is one topic that has received little serious
consideration: government repression. At first glance* this
is surprising since government repression has far-reaching
social* political and human consequences.
but a closer look reveals some impediments that have
contributed to this lack of consideration. Historically* it
can be attributed to serious imperfections in the means
available for monitoring government repression world-wide*
The problem was Cand still isl further compounded by
government efforts to disguise and conceal the true state of
affairs. These obstacles have been at least partially
overcome by recent collections of comparative data (e.g.*
Gastil* 1978-82; Taylor and Jodice* 1983a* bl that have
improved both the quality and quantity of data regarding*
among other things* the extent of civil and political
liberties* government sanctions* and political executions.
7Public policy is another factor that can and has
influenced the extent of focus on political repression.
Since it often sets the tone for any coordinated effort to
address social problems* its declining comwi tment to the
problem of repression is unfortunate* In spite of efforts
by organizations such as Amnesty International* which
attempt to monitor violations of human rights around the
world* the issue in recent years has been overshadowed by
"more pressing" global problems* One contributing factor has
been the declining commitment of the United States to the
improvement of human rights and the elimination of
repression* Klare and Arnson argue that the Reagan
Administration has reversed the efforts of President Carter
by acting "to downgrade the importance placed on human
rights in official government policy" 11981:2)* This shift
is rather unfortunate for it serves to undermine many
efforts directed at improving the sorrowfully deteriorated
state of human rights*
These are some of the factors that have dampened the
interest in government repression* Concomitantly* the
acuteness of the problem has taken on new dimensions and is
now an integral part of international relations* For
example* according to some observers (e*g*« Klare and
Arnson* 19811* the Reagan Administration with the
cooperation of its allies are engaged* with missionary zeal*
in "supplying repression" to a number of right-wing
authoritarian regimes through what is known as the
a"international repression trade." This is an area of
commerce in which authoritarian regimes actively trade with
various western powers to acquire the technology and know-
how to suppress opposition*
Furthermore* present circumstances in £1 Salvador* Chile
and South Africa give us reason enough to pursue* for both
intellectual and practical reasons* contributions in this
area* Conditions of this magnitude undoubtedly pose a
challenge for understanding the socio-economic conditions
upon which such actions are founded and presents us with the
question of the extent to which government repression is
more endemic to certain nations*
Hopefully* the above discussion is sufficient to indicate
the importance of repression as both an intellectual and
moral problem* and thus one deserving of attention* Any
effort to address this problem must begin with a discussion
of the meaning of repression* The following section focuses
on this issue* Then I state the purpose of this thesis which
in general will be to examine and test three competing
theoretical perspectives on government repression* I will
then present a statement of the theoretical significance of
the proposed research and conclude the chapter with a
summary of the chapter and an overview of the remaining
chapters*
9Political Repression Defined
Like many issues of concern to social scientists*
government repression has been defined in various ways*
McCarmant (198^:221* for example* defines political
repression as:
those coercive activities carried out by
rulers against opposition* real or imagined*
for the purpose of weakening its ability to
oppose or take control.
Although McCarmant (1964) does not elaborate* this
interpretation includes two essential elements: 1) the use
of coercion* and (21 the purpose of coercion* Together these
two features explain government repression as actions with
specific intentions* This definition denotes acts of
forcefully curbing or restraining dissent in order to
maintain the status quo* It is a fairly accurate
interpretation of repression* However* it is limited in its
scope and some elaboration may therefore be appropriate*
First* one may argue that the threat of coercion is also
repressive In nature and thus should be included in any
definition* since it may serve to inhibit any potential
opposition* Second* the above definition limits the idea of
repression to coercive activities against a "real or
imagined" opposition* Implicit in this* but perhaps in need
of additional emphasis* is the notion that a perceived
threat (by an opposition) against the authorities can be
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crucial in coercive activities. As Duff and McCamant
11976525) point out* repression is really a reflection of
the insecurity felt by the government:
it is an indication that the government feels
threatened. It is an admission by the government
that the population Mould like to express its
dissatisfaction with the government or the social
situation. ..and would express such discontent if it
were allowed to do so.
For comparison we can look to the definition provided by
Bissel et al. (1978* cited in Stohl and Lopez, 198427*:
the use of coercion or the threat of coercion
against opponents or potential opponents in
order to prevent or weaken their capability to
oppose the authorities and their policies*
This definition is more complete than the former. A
synthesis of the two, however, may provide a more adequate
definition of repression. Thus, I will define government
repression as the threat or use of coercion against
opponents - perceived or potential - in order to inhibit
their ability to express opposition to authorities and/or
their policies.
Statement of Purpose
Recent focus on the human rights situation around the
world has coincided with a rekindling of interest and
scholarly research on political repression fe.g., Wolfe*
1973; Duff and McCamant, 1976; Timberlake and Williams,
19841 and democracy fe.g., kinham, 1970; Jackman, 1974;
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Bollen* 1983* Bollen and Jackman* 19851 • To a large extent
existing comparative research has centered on tests of three
alternative theoretical perspectives on political
repression: the conflict approach (e.y.* Jacobs and Britt*
1979; Williams and Timberlake* 19841t the modernization
approach (e.g.* Timberlake and Williams* 19841; and the
dependency/world systems approach (e.g.* Timberlake and
Williams* 19841. However* cross-national research in this
area is limited, in particular* researchers have not
simultaneously tested all three perspectives.
This thesis represents an attempt to fill this gap by
evaluating the empirical validity of the three alternative
theoretical perspectives on government repression* The first
step Kill be to review the three theoretical perspectives
and examine the existing empirical research for each
theoretical perspective. Then* specific hypotheses derived
from the three alternative perspectives will be tested
s imultaneously.
Summary and Overview
In this chapter I addressed the problem of government
repression. I also considered the definition of repression
and concluded by outlining the purpose and significance of
the thesis. Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the three
theoretical arguments and includes an overview of empirical
research on each orientation. Chapter 3 consists of a
12
discussion of the data and method used in the study* Chapter
4 contains the findings of the study* Finally* a discussion
of the significance and implications of the findings is
presented in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The practice of emphasizing one approach and
deemphasizing or ignoring the relevance of another is a
common practice* Attempts at formulating explanations of
government repression are also prone to this practice. Most
cross-national studies of government repression nave
centered on tests of one of three contending ""iconic"
models; namely* the conflict* modernization* and
dependency/world-system approaches*
This thesis departs from the conventional practice and
will instead simultaneously test three hypothesis derived
from the three competing theoretical perspectives* This
chapter outlines the divergence* but more importantly* the
relevance of each of the perspectives in explaining
government repression* The chapter is divided into three
main sections - each section contains an outline of the
theoretical perspective and a discussion of the relevant
empirical research*
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The Conflict Approach
Proponents of the conflict orientation propose that a
high level of internal economic inequality is a primary
determinant of government repression* The contention is that
economic inequality both reflects and perpetuates elite
control of political poker and this leads to government
repression* This hypothesis has its foundations in the
Marxian conception of the structure of society* In this
regard* it may be appropriate to first examine the main
elements of Marx^s contributions to an understanding of the
nature of society* This is followed by a discussion of the
role of the state which will be centered around the debate
between conflict theorists in the structuralist and the
instrumentalist theoretical camps* Finally* this section
concludes with a review of the extant empirical research*
Marx and Class Conflict* For Marx* society can be
understood as consisting of two key elements^ the
substructure and the superstructure* The substructure
I composed of the forces of production and the relations of
production! is the foundation determining the character of
the basic institutions of society (i.e.. the
superstructure). In the following passage, Marx and Engels
11968:182 [1859]) summarize their position on the nature of
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the relationship between the substructure and
superstructure:
In the social production of their life* men enter
into definite relations that are indispensable and
independent of their will* relations of production
which correspond to a definite stage of development
of their material productive forces* The sum total
of these relations of production constitute the
economic structure of society* the real foundation*
on which rises a legal and political superstructure
and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness* The mode of production of material
life conditions the social* political and intellectual
life process in general*
The mode of production is a system of production in which
individuals interact with each other and nature for their
material existence. Each mode of production is the product
of the relationship between the forces and relations of
production. The forces of production include the instruments
and technology used in the production process* within the
relations of production* on the other hand* there exists a
class of owners of the means of production and a class of
non-owners fas well as various subsidiary classes such as
the petit-bourgeoisie and the lumpen proletariat* in
capitalism* which are aligned with one or the other of these
two major classes). It is the relationship between the two
classes in the capitalist mode of production which is of
primary concern here*
Proponents of this perspective argue that there is open
or incipient hostility between the two classes owing to the
exploitation and domination of the non-owners by the owning
class* It is important to note that •". • • domination* in
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Marxist thoughtt is not an inherent part of the human
condition* just as conflict is not an inherent feature of
human nature* Domination and conflict are inherent {only) in
class societies * . •" (Miliband* 1977:18). The basis of
this "inherent" domination of one class by another is the
process of capital accumulation where the dominant class has
to necessarily (and continuously) extract surplus value* The
acceleration of capital accumulation and exploitation of the
laboring class are the forces that give rise to the
polarization of wealth between the two primary classes and
that intensify the antagonism and hostility between them*
Although Marxists would argue that class domination is
economically determined* it nevertheless transcends the
economic sphere and emerges as the underlying feature of the
superstructure - having "many different and related facets"
(Miliband* 1977:20)* In this tradition* the state emerges
as an institution which reflects the existing relations
between the classes* Unlike other theories of the state*
Marxist theory does not see this institution as
representative of "society as a whole." This* according to
Miliband (1977:66)* follows from the Marxian conception of
society as "class society." The state is not detached from
the prevalent class conflict but is a fundamental part of
it: "The executive of the modern state is but a committee
for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie"
(Marx and Engels* 1948:111* This famous and often quoted
statement represents the foundation for much of the debate
17
among political sociologists regarding the political economy
of the state; and the extent of this controversy is no less
intense within the Marxian school of thought than it is
among those outside it (e.g.* Miliband* 1977; Poulantzas*
19781. Within Marxism the controversy has taken the form of
a debate between the instrumentalists and structuralists.
The Instrumentalists. Marxists of the instrumentalist
persuasion (e.g.* Sweezy* 1942; Domhoff, 1967* Miliband*
19771 generally regard the state as an instrument of the
bourgeoisie. This interpretation of the state is closely
aligned with the sentiments of Marx and Engels expressed in
Ifafi Communist Manifesto (1948). According to Paul Sweezy*
for example* the state is "an instrument in the hands of the
ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing tne stability of
the class structure. • ." (1942:243). Oomhoff*s (1967* 19711
work is representative of the major contemporary
contributions to the instrumentalist view. He provides an
elaborate description of the professional and personal
interrelationships and links between top government and
corporate elites. This strong reciprocal relationship is
further intensified by the exchange of strategic roles in
government and the economy. Consequently* those of the
instrumentalist persuasion claim that "corporate leaders act
in concert with political and other institutional leaders to
protect capitalist interests and to assure preservation of
the prevailing class system" (Marger* 1981:104).
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The Structuralists* The structuralist alternative puts
more emphasis on the structure of society than on the links
between the elites IMarger. 1981:104)* Nicos Poulantzas
119691 is one prominent Marxist of the structuralist
persuasion who argues that the contradictions of the
(capitalist) economic system make it necessary for the state
to represent the interests of the capitalist class:
(Tlhe direct participation of members of the
capitalist class in the state apparatus and in the
government* • • • is not the important side of the
matter* The relation between the bourgeois class
and the state is an objective relation* This means
that if the function of the state in a determinate
social formation and the interests of the dominant
class in this formation coincide* it is by reason
of the system itself: the direct participation of
members of the ruling class in the state apparatus
is not the cause but the effect* and moreover a
chance and contingent one* of this objective
coincidence (Poulantzas* 1969* cited in Gold et
al.t 1975:36J.
Poulantzas views the state as relatively autonomous "from
manipulation by specific capitalist-class members or
interests" (Gold et al*. 1975:381. Instead* he maintains
that the state performs the function of "mediating" the
contradictions of the capital accumulation process which are
potentially destructive to the economic system.
Economic Inequality and Repression. Despite the differences
between these two views* the underlying theme of both views
is that the state is a function of the logic of the mode of
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production* it is "the product and the manifestation of the
irreconcilability of class antagonisms*1 (Lenin* 1974:8). As
class polarization (characterized by economic inequality)
increases* it intensifies class conflict and threatens the
security and stability of the state and economic structure*
This increases the likelehood that the state will engage in
repressive activities*
This interpretation of the state provides us with a
testable hypothesis: Economic inequality has a positive
effect on repressive activities*
Previous Empirical Research* A number of researchers have
examined the relationship between inequality and the use of
force as a means of social control* Jacobs and Britt (19791*
for example* tested this relationship in the context of
state governments in the United States; that is* the unit of
analysis in their study was the American state* They
operationalized state coercion (the dependent variable) as
the use of deadly force by the police* This indicator was
measured by the number of Killings committed by the police
between 1961 and 1970 as a proportion of the mean population
for the same period* The Gini index of income inequality for
1960 was employed as a measure of income inequality* After
controlling for eight other variables (i.e.* police per
capita* percent change in population* percent black* percent
of state residents residing in large cities* violent crime
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rates* border status* southern status* and percent poor)*
they found a significant and positive relationship between
income inequality and police use of deadly force*
Until recently* cross-national research examining the
relationship between inequality and the use of repression
has been limited* Williams and Timberlake*s (1984>
"Structured Inequality* Conflict* and Control: A Cross-
National Test of the Threat Hypothesis" has been a welcome
contribution to the literature* Drawing from the conflict
argument* they test the hypothesis that income inequality
has a positive impact on the use of negative sanctions by
national governments* Government santions 11973—77) was used
as an aggregate measure of government repression* Income
inequality was estimated by the concentration of income in
the top ten percent of total households in a country* With a
sample of seventy nations* they found that inequality did
not have a significant effect on government sanctions* They
also included political exclusion as an independent variable
in order "to explore the nature of the relationship" between
the two (1984:4201* The results indicate that politically
exclusive regimes tend to be more repressive* In addition*
they also found that income inequality had a significant
positive effect on political exclusion* Given this* they
suggest the posibility of an indirect relationship between
income inequality and government sanctioning*
One important point of concern however* Williams and
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Timberlake (1984) treated political exclusion as
analytically distinct from repression* They used the
Gastil 11982) "political rights index" as an indicator of
the extent of political exclusion in a nation* This index
reflects "the formalized ability of people to play a part in
determining who and what laws or policies will govern one's
country" {1984:4231* Nations are ranked on a seven-point
scale where a rating of ID indicates that a state is least
exclusive; having an open and competitive electoral process*
A rating of (2) is given to states that are relatively free
but experience extreme economic inequality or use
intimidating violence* Ratings of (3) to (5) reflect states
with "less effective implementation of democratic processes"
(1982:9). A rating of (61 is given to states without a
competitive electoral process and (7) for states where top
political leaders "appear by their actions to feel little
constraint from public opinion or popular tradition"
(1982:15).
As mentioned* they predicted and presented empirical
support for a positive relationship between exclusion and
repression. A more appropriate interpretation of this index
might be that it is simply another manifestation of
government repression. Support for this claim can be
established from their conclusion that: "Elitist governments
are structurally repressive in the sense that they deny the
masses access to political participation" (1984:425). In
sum. while Williams and Timberlake (1984) included political
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exclusion as an independent variable in their analysis* the
nature of the "political rights index" suggests that it is
more appropriate and theoretically sound to view exclusion
as another aspect of government repression* In fact* in a
later study by Nuller t 19851 on the relationship between
income inequality* repression and political violence* the
"political rights index" was employed as a measure of
government repression*
These two indicators then (i.e.* sanctions and exclusion)
can be viewed as empirical manifestations of a similar
concept: government repression* Consequently* by including
political exclusion as an independent variable* the effect
of income inequality on government sanctions may have been
suppressed* In light of this* it is only fitting that this
relationship be reevaluated* In this thesis I reexamine the
relationship between income inequality and government
sanctions - omitting the variable political exclusion*
The Modernization Approach
A major factor contributing to the increased concern with
development and social change has been the emergence of new
independent nations and the problems associated with their
independence* The literature in this area is immense and
was instrumental in leading much of the research in the
social sciences during the 1950s and 1960s* Modernization
theorists were basically concerned with societal evolution
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and the transition of nations from traditional to modern
societies (e.g.* Levy* 1967* Moore, 1963)*
By employing and modifying the typologies of classical
evolutionary theorists* modernization theorists identified
the dominant factors essential to "modernization*" One main
focus of modernization theorists has been the concern with
political development* Contributions in this area - both
normative and empirical - are substantial and reflective of
an area of inquiry that is broad and diverse fcf* Chadok*
1973:229-251). Interestingly enough* amidst this diversity
there remains a strong association between economic and
political development* Another common feature of this social
mobilization approach* as it is often called* is its
emphasis on endogenous structural factors that are perceived
as functionally constituting and influencing particular
social structures*
The idea of government repression is very much related to
the development issue* As Duff and McCamant 119761 state*
modernization theorists hold that government repression is
inversely related to economic development* This view can be
attributed to the works of* among others* Lerner (1958) and
Lipset (1959)* Implicit in these works on economic
development and political democracy is an argument about the
causes of government repression* The discussion here will
center on examining the relationship between economic
development* political democracy and government repression*
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Economic Development and Government Repression* While
there have been numerous definitions of "modernization*** it
is often equated and associated with industrialization and
technology* Levy (1967:190) defines modernization in terms
of technological advancement and considers a society more
modernized:
the greater the ratio of inanimate to animate power
sources and the greater the extent to which human
efforts are multiplied by the use of tools*
A somewhat broader but related definition of
modernization is:
(the! total transformation of a traditional or
pre-modern society into the types of technology
and associated social organization that
characterize the advanced* economically prosperous*
and relatively politically stable nations of the
Western World*. .In fact* we may***speak of the
process as industrialization* Industrialization
means the extensive use of inanimate sources of
power for economic production* and all that entails
by way of organization* transportation* communication*
and so on (Moore* 1963:89* 91-92 as cited in
Appelbaum* 1970:38)*
Note that there is a strong tendency to relate
modernization with socio-economic (and industrial)
development* Those who adhere to the modernization position
regard these socio-economic changes as essential to the
development of political democracy* Lerner (1958)* for
example* presents a sequential and causal interpretation of
this process* He claims that the "secular evolution of a
participant society appears to involve a regular sequence
25
of•••phases" (1958:601* Urbanization is seen as the "take-
off" stage of this process - necessitating the
transformation of traditional constructs and establishing
the basis for the modern production process* This
development encompasses increased literacy* As a nation's
literacy rate increases* the mass media become prominent and
further stimulate higher literacy and education* These
socio-structural changes are essentially prerequisites and
reproductive forces of economic development*
Just as modernization continues to promote education and
literacy* it leads to increased public awareness and
participation in the political process* This transition
creates a more diffuse and democratic political structure*
As Lerner explains* "(d)emocratic goverance...typically
appears as a crowning institution of the participant
society" (1958:641* Thus* economic development* or more
generally* modernization necessarily spearheads processes of
political change and initiates the emergence of a democratic
political system* As such* economically developed nations
are perceived to have greater civil and political liberties*
This orientation* then* can be logically expanded to include
the notion of government repression* Since the
institutionalization of democratic processes involves the
notion of a participant society (which includes the ability
of people to express opposition and dissent)* the lack of
such freedom clearly reflects the exclusive and repressive
nature of a regime* Therefore* as economic development
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leads to democratization* the incidence of government
repression also becomes less frequent and consistent. I
will test the hypothesis that economic development has a
negative effect on government repression*
Previous Empirical Research* The relationship between the
emergence of modern institutions and democracy has been
empirically analyzed by* among others* Lerner (19581* Lipset
(1959)* McCrone and Cnudde (1967)* Smith (1969)* Minham
(1970), Bollen (1963) and oollen and Jackman (1985)* Khile
diverse measures of political democracy have been used by
previous cross-national researchers* there is general
support for a positive relationship between socioeconomic
development and political democracy*
Bollen (1983)* for example* finds strong support for a
positive relationship between economic development and
political democracy for a sample of one hundred countries*
Political democracy was measured with an index consisting of
six indicators: (1) fairness of elections* (2) whether chief
executives are elected or not; (3) the means of selecting
legislators and the effectiveness of the process; (4)
freedom of the press; (5) freedom of opposition groups? and
(6) use of government sanctions (1983:471* see Bollen [1980
J
for a description of this index)* Economic development was
measured as energy consumption per capita (see Bollen*
1983:471-472).
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However* the relationship between economic development
and government repression has not been fully explored*
Timberlake and Williams* (1984) research provides little
support for this assertion* The results of their analysis
indicate that economic development has a negative effect on
repression* but the effect is weak*
The Dependency/World Systems Approach
The influence of modernization theory has recently been
eclipsed by the critique and revisions presented by
proponents of the dependency approach regarding the nature
of relations between modern and non-modern nations (e.g.*
Dos Santos* 1976 11968]; Frank* 1969)* The inability of most
Third World nations and especially Latin America to overcome
severe structural problems despite the diffusion of
modernizing agents stimulated the early literature on
dependency* Andre Gunder Frank (1968* 19691 and Dos Santos
11970) were among the first to propose a new direction in
the study of development* Contrary to the modernization
argument* Frank argued that increased contact and
interaction through the influx of capital and technology
from the developed nations is detrimental to less developed
nations* It leads to the perpetuation of an inadequate
infrastructure primarily because the relationship (based on
unequal exchange) is one of exploitation by the developed
nations* This then subjects the economies of less developed
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nations to their more affluent and dynamic counterparts*
Structure of the Korld Economy and the State. Since these
early works* proponents of dependency theory have expanded
on and established some parallel with the world system
paradigm* Adherents of world system theory propose that
there exists a capitalist world economy composed of three
structural categories (core* semi-periphery anc periphery!
which are linked through an international division of labor
dominated by the core ( wallerstein* 19791* Like dependency
theorists* world system theorists argue that non-core
nations are exposed to exploitation by the core through
exchange relations thus recreating the structural barriers
that maintain the international division of labor and the
world system (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson* 19771* The
dependency/world system position suggests that dependence
tends to distort the development process of noncore nations
I Frank* 1969; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn* 19851* Although not
all dependency theorists agree on the nature of uneven
development* the basic view is that noncore nations do not
follow the path of development proposed by modernization
theorists* Tests of the dependency/world system theory by
Chase-Dunn 119751* Rubinson (19761* and Bornschier and
Chase-Dunn 119851 suggest that dependence distorts economic
development*
The underlying argument is that the extraction of surplus
from non-core countries is facilitated by the converging
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interests of core and non-core elites* This naturally
contributes to continued peripheralization of non-core
nations* In this process* the non-core elites are seen as
systematically employing the local state structure - even to
the extent of limiting political freedom - to maintain their
advantageous position (cf. Bollen, 1983:4701. In this
regard, the state apparatus functions (through repression!
to preserve the collective interests of elites in the
periphery* Political democracy* as such* is not as common
in non-core nations as it is in core nations (Chirot, 19775"
Bollen, 19831*
An additional aspect of this argument is the claim of
some tneorists (e.g., Chirot, 1977:801 that semi-peripheral
nations have political systems that are much stronger and
repressive in relation to peripheral nations* As semi-
peripheral countries "aspire to the core", the economic
demands on them become more exorbitant (Bollen* 1933: V705
see also Chirot, 1977:77). This leads to a tendency for
governments in the semi-periphery to play a more direct role
in the economic process - making them strong and less
tolerant of dissent:
The state (in the semi-periphery) will have to
repress. • .in order to keep consumption down
and investment high. Since the state's short-term
economic goal is to maximize investment while
keeping cost down, the demands of a growing
working class will. • .be repressed (Chirot,
1977:80-81).
From this, we can deduce the following: since non-core
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nations remain dependent, experience uneven development and
are characterized by elite domination, dissent by the masses
posses a threat to the existing structural conditions. And
this lack of tolerence for dissent may be greater in the
semi-periphery* As such* semi-peripheral countries and to a
lesser extent peripheral countries should be more repressive
than core countries*
Previous Empirical Research. Results of previous cross-
national research suggest the possibility of a positive
relationship between dependence and political repression
ITimberlake and Williams* 1984). However* this link is not
only weak but it is also one aspect of dependency theory
that has not been sufficiently explored* Timberlake and
Williams" C1984) cross-national study suggests that
dependence has no direct effect on government repression.
Using cross-sectional data for seventy-two countries in
circa 1975, they find that politically exclusive regimes
Imeasured by Gastil's 11982] "political rights index") are
more apt to resort to repression.
In examining the results presented by Timberlake and
Williams 11984), I find that when political exclusion was
regressed on dependence, the coefficient for dependence
turns out to be significant* based on the positive
relationship between dependence and exclusion and also
between exclusion and repression, they suggest a possible
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indirect relationship between dependence and government
repression. However* I have sugested reasons why it may be
theoretically more reasonable to treat exclusion as another
aspect of repression- Thus, it is likely that by treating
political exclusion as an independent variable separate from
repression* the impact of dependence on government
repression may have been suppressed*
Given this probable situation* the relationship between
dependence and repression will be reexamined by excluding
political exclusion from the analysis. This will also
enable us to assess more confidently the significance of
this perspective relative to the others-
Other related cross-national studies include Bollen*s
1 19831 analysis of world-system position and dependency on
democracy* and Soil en and Jackman's 119851 analysis of the
relationship between world-system position and political
democracy. Both of these studies used Bollen*s 11930)
political democracy index (that is* the six indicators
listed above* and Snyder and Kick's (19791 classification of
world-system position. The results reported in both studies
support the argument that non-core nations have less
democratic regimes. In addition, Bollen (19831476) also
finds that ecomonic dependence (measured by penetration of
foreign capital) has no significant effect on political
democracy.
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Summary
The focus of this chapter has been on a discussion of the
three major perspectives on government repression and the
previous research* As the overview illustrates* each
approach essentially emphasizes one main determinant of
government repression*
The conflict argument* as summarized above, views
repression as determined by economic inequality* In
contrast* modernization theorists essentially argue that
economic development is a Key to greater political
stability* freedom and less government repression* The third
argument advanced by dependence/world system theorists
suggests that due to the dynamics of the world economic
system* countries in the semi-periphery land to a lesser
extent* countries in the periphery* are more likely to be
repressive* In the following chapter* I discuss the data and
method used to empirically evaluate the hypotheses derived
from the three theoretical traditions*
CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHOD
Although other cross-national researchers have attempted
to test hypotheses derived from one of the three
perspectives discussed in Chapter 2* no effort has been made
to empirically test simultaneously the empirical validity of
all three arguments. In addition* as the review in the
previous chapter shows* the results of previous cross-
national research have been inconclusive*
Another drawback of earlier studies (i.e., Timberlake and
Williams* 1984; Williams and Timberlake* 19841 is the
inappropriate use of political exclusion in the analysis of
government sanctioning* This may possibly explain why
previous studies find no significant relationship between
income inequality and repression IWilliams and Timberlake*
19841 or between dependence and repression fTimberlake and
Williams* 1984)*
This thesis attempts to correct these shortcomings byr
II examining simultaneously all three explanations of
repression; and
2) omitting political exclusion from the analysis*
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Findings from this study should provide more insight into
the importance of certain structural factors that affect
repression* Further* it may also possibly suggest why
previous studies were unable to establish any significant
relationships between income inequality or dependence and
government repression*
In this chapter I describe the data and method* After a
few words about the sample* I turn to the variables employed
in this research and the operational measures or indicators
ot these variables* Following this* I describe the method of
analysis employed and conclude the chapter with a summary*
Sample
The unit of analysis in this study is the nation-state*
Sixty nations for which requisite data were available are
included in the analyses Csee Appendix I)* There are
obvious limitations associated with this sample* The most
obvious problem is that this is a non-probability sample*
However* due to the the lack of universality in the
reporting of data for heterogenous units such as nations*
this situation is unavoidable* The drawback of this sampling
technique is the biasing effects that it can have on the
results* This threat is minimized since the sample is well
represented by nations in the core (n-131* semi-periphery
ln=19) and periphery ln=28)*
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Dependent Variable
Government repression is measured as the number of
government sanctions imposed H to neutralizet suppress* or
eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the
government* the regime* or the state itself" (Taylor and
Jodice* 1983b:62>. Specifically* this indicator consists of
(al censorship of individual or institutional political
publications (i.e.* government actions to restrict or
intimidate the mass media by actions ranging from censoring
news and reports to shutting down news agencies!* Cb)
general restrictions on political activitity (i.e.*
declaring martial law* mobilizing troops for domestic
security and instituting curfewsl* and (cl restrictions on
the social and political behavior of individuals* parties or
political organizations (i.e.* the persecution of
individuals for political beliefs and activities* harassing
or banning political parties* arresting opposition leaders
for security reasons* deporting individuals who express
opposition and arresting or deporting individuals involved
in protest activities* strikes* riots and armed attacksl
(1983b:62-63l.
These indicators clearly represent actions that attempt
to inhibit the ability of individuals or groups to express
opposition. In this regard* this measure of repression
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corresponds to the definition developed in Chapter 1* It is
also one that is widely employed in existing cross-national
research (e.g., Timberlake and Williams, 19845 Williams and
Timberlake, 1984* Weede, 1986* Muller, 1985* 1986). Data
for this variable were taken from The kQLlsi Handbook of
EQlitical and Social Indicator s (Taylor and Jodice,
1983b:64-671* To ensure consistency in the number of
sanctions imposed, the total number of sanctions between
1963-1967 (logged to base 10 in order to correct for
skewnessl was used*
Independent Variables
Economic Development* The level of economic development*
which is the key independent variable in modernization
theory, is measured as energy consumption (in kilogrammes of
coal) per capita for circa 1965* I use this measure
primarily because it is widely accepted as a reliable
measure of economic development (e.g., Taylor and Hudson*
1972:291; Jackman, 1974:35; Bollen, 1983=4721. Data for this
variable were taken from the United Nations* (1966:344-3471
Statistical Yearfaook -
Morld System Position* The measure of world system
position used here is one developed by Snyder and kick
(1979:1104-11161* This measure reflects a nation's world
system position for circa 1965. This classification of
core, periphery and semi-periphery is based on a block-model
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analysis of four networks of international interaction
(i.e.* the extent of trade flow* military interventiont
treaty memberships * and diplomatic tiesl reflecting the
economic and political dimensions and influence of nations
in the world-system* Unlike noncore nations* countries in
the core are seen as dominant powers in the world economy
and influential in international affairs fSnyder and Kick*
1979:1106).
This measure is used because it has been widely accepted
in the literature (e.g., Bollen* 1983t Nolan* 1983; Frey and
Dietz* 1984? Bollen and Jackman* 1985). Apparently* Snyder
and Kick 11979) misclassif ied several nations in their
analysis Isee Bollen* 19835473-476). Based on his
reevaluation Bollen suggests that instead of being in the
core* Spain* Portugal and South Africa should be classified
as semi-peripheral nations. In addition* Taiwan* Iraq and
Saudi Arabia were also reclassified as peripheral nations.
Since Spain* South Africa and Iraq are included in this
analysis* I recoded them accordingly. Two dummy variables
were created for the semi-periphery and periphery - with the
core treated as the omitted (reference) category. This was
done in order to estimate the deviation of the two dummy
variables from the core.
^Economic Inequality. The measure of economic inequality
used here is the distribution of income within a nation. The
data for income distribution refer to the portion of a
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nation"s total income received by the upper 10 percent of
households. As Williams and Timberlake (1984=4221 state*
the size distribution (or concentration! of income is viewed
as more appropriate than the Gini index of income inequality
since the theoretical implications of the inequality
argument are focused on the concentration of wealth rather
than its distribution across the population* A measure of
the concentration of wealth rather than income would be more
desirable since it is a more reliable measure of economic
inequality. Cross-national data for this variable are not
available. Income inequality data are for circa 1965 and
were obtained from The Worl d Hand book at Political And
£££ial Indicators (Taylor and Jodice* 1983a: 134-1361
Control Variables
It is important that relevant controls be included in a
research design in order to reduce threats to the validity
of the estimates. Control variables help minimize the effect
of extraneous factors that may undermine any causal
inferences of the research. In addition* it also provides
for more accurate estimates of the relationships explored.
Political Conflict. Since it is reasonable to assume that
political conflict can pose a threat to a particular regime
and therefore also lead to increased sanctions* a control
for political conflict was included. The number of protest
demonstrations for the period 1963-67 ( f+1 Hogged base 10 to
correct for skewness) Mas employed as a measure of political
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conflict. This measure is based on the following definition
of political conflicts "a nonviolent gathering of people
organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a
regime or government or one or more of its leaders* or
against its ideology* policy* intended policy* or lack of
policy* or against its previous action or intended action"
f Taylor and Jodice* 1983b2l9). Data for protest
demonstrations were taken from The Maxld Handbook of
EQlitJcaJ, and Social Ind icator s C Taylor and Jodice*
1983b522-251.
Eastern Bloc Status. Another concern in this research
centers on a possible confounding effect that the inclusion
of eastern bloc countries may have on the estimates* Their
unique status as highly centralized and "closed" social
systems raises some uncertainties about their effects.
Although there are only six eastern bloc countries in the
sample* it is still reasonable to suspect the impact of
these countries. Therefore* as a precaution* a dummy
variable for eastern bloc status was included as a control
variable in the analysis.
Method of Analysis
I used ordinary least-squares regression to estimate the
effects of the independent variables on government
repression by regressing the dependent variable (government
sanctions! on the independent and control variables. The
equation below summarizes tne predicted effects of the
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variables on government repression:
III Y = a + blXl - b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + e
where Y = total sanctions (1963-67* logged base 101
a = constant
b = unstandardized regression coefficient
XI = income inequality (circa 19651
X2 = energy consumption per capita (1965* logged base
10)
X3 = peripheral status (dummy variable* circa 19651
X*» = semi-peripheral status (dummy variable* circa
19651
X5 = political conflict (number of protest
demonstrations 1963-67* logged base 10)
X6 = eastern bloc status (dummy variable* 1965)
e •= residual term
Several diagnostics Mere used to assess the stability of
the estimates* One specific concern is the problem of
multicollinearity. When serious problems of collinearity
exist* the regression estimates will be unreliable (Kim and
Kohout* 1975:340; see also Rockwell* 1975). Using
Haitovsky*s heuristic test (Rockwell* 1975) the equations
were checked for multicollinearity. Outliers are another
common concern in cross-national research since they deviate
from the predicted pattern and often bias the estimates. The
plot of standardized residuals (which is a technique that
%1
allows for the identification of outliersl was used to check
for this problem*
Sunary
This chapter contained a discussion of the sample and
data and method* I presented a summary of the various
indicators and operational measures used in the analysis*
The last section contained a description of the method of
analysis and various diagnostics that were carried out to
assess the stability of estimates*
CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
This chapter presents the results of the analysis* The
chapter is divided into two main sections* First? the
bivariate results are presented and the issue of
multicollinearity is examined* Results of several different
regression analyses are reported in the second section*
Bivariate Results
The bivariate (zero-order correlations) results are
presented in Table 1* Government sanctions (SANCTG67) and
protest demonstrations (PR0TES67) fr = 0*5121 have a strong
relationship* This association is also in the predicted
direction* The other variables that are related to sanctions
in the predicted direction include income inequality
(INEQ1965) fr = 0*131). eastern bloc (EASTBLOC) (r = 0.100),
and semi-peripheral status (SEMIPHER) (r = 0*280). However*
these coefficients are relatively small* ranging from 0*100
to 0*280* Note that the relationship between government
sanctions (SANCTG67) and energy consumption is
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Table 1
Zero-Order Correlations among the Variables and
Means and Standard Deviations (N=6C)
4
1.SANCTG67 1.00 .512 .056 .131 -.196 .280 .100
2.PRQTES67 1.000 .310 -.084 -.286 .029 -.220
3.ENERGY65 1.000 -.544 -.482 .241 .322
4.INEU1965 1.000 .433 -.054 -.512
5.PERIPHER 1.000 -.636 -.089
6.SEMIPHER 1.000 .131
7.EASTBLOC 1.000
Mean 3.39 1.81 6.54 34.7 0.46 0.31 1.00
S.D. • 1.26 1.54 1.57 10.1 0.50 0.46 0.30
SANCTG67 = Sanctions* 1963-67 Hog 101
PR0TES67 = Protest Demonstrations, 1963-67 (f+l]log 10J
ENERGY65 = Energy Consumption, 1965 Hog 101
INEU1965 = Income Inequality, circa 1965
PERIPHER = Periphery, circa 1965
SEMIPHER = Semi-periphery, circa 1965
EASTBLOC = Eastern Bloc Nations, 1965
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ItKERGYbbl contrary to expectations Ir = 0-0561 . This is
also the case with the periphery (PERIPHER) Ir = -0.196).
Multicollinearity or the existence of highly interrelated
independent variables can seriously degrade the estimates*
There is a fairly strong negative correlation between the
periphery (PERIPHER) and semi-peri pnery (SEMIPHER) Ir =
-C.636). In addition? the matrix also indicates a relatively
strong correlation between energy consumption (ENERGY65) and
income inequality (INEQ1965) fr = -0.544). While these
correlations are relatively strong* the general rule of
thumb is that one need not be concerned with the problem of
multicollinearity unless the correlation coefficients range
from 0*8 to 1.0 fKim and Kohout* 1975:3401. However*
Rockwell (1975:312) suggests that relying on this procedure
is risky. Although there are a number of different tests to
check tor multicollinearity* Rockwell 11975:3131 suggests
that where dummy variables are involved (as in this
analysis)* the Haitovsky heuristic test should be used.
Therefore to ensure reliability of the estimates a check for
multicollinearity was undertaken for the full sample. The
results or this test (Chi-square = 6.619; d.f. = 151
indicate that severe multicollinearity is not a problem.
Regression Results
Unlike the bivariate analysis* regression enables us to
estimate the unique effect of each explanatory variable on
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the dependent variable* Thus* it provides a more accurate
summary of the relationship by controlling for the effects
of other variables*
The first column of Table 2 lists the unstandardized
regression coefficients and standard errors for the full
sample of 60 countries* Among the variables of theoretical
importance* only income inequality {INEG1965) is
statistically significant lb = 0*513). Although the
coefficients for semi-periphery (SEHIPHER) (b = 0*4181 and
energy consumption (ENERGY65) fb = -0*1041 are in the
predicted direction* they are not significant* Also note
that the coefficients for eastern bloc nations (EASTBLOC* lb
= 1*9491 and protest demonstration IPR0TES67) fb = 0*534)
are positive and significant* Given these results* one may
be inclined to conclude that economic development and world
system position do not influence government repression*
Instead* only income inequality turns out to be an important
predictor of government repression*
These estimates* however* were influenced by several
outliers* In the plot of standardized residuals* El
Salvador* New Zealand* the Philippines* Uganda* and
Madagascar turned out to be extreme outliers deviating from
the general predicted pattern* Checks were made to ensure
that there were no coding errors that may have caused these
outliers* The other possible explanations for this situation
would be either data for these countries are unreliable or
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Table 2
Ordinary Least-Squares ICLS1 Estimates of Government
Sanctions 1963-67a
Eq.l eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4
SANCTS67 SANC TS67 SAN0EN67 SAN0EN67
(N=60) (^=55) ( N=60
)
(N=56)
PR0TES67 0.534*
10.090)
0.556*
(0.075)
PR0DEN67 0.dl2*
(0.095)
0.732*
(0.078)
EASTBLOC 1.949* 1.779* 0.460* 0.563*
10.550) (0.466) (0.287) (0.198)
INEQ1965 0.513* 0.048* 0.019* 0.024*
10.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006)
SEHIPHER 0.418 0.624 0.111 0.092
(0.414) (0.349) (0.218) (0.152)
ENERGY65 -0.104 -0.088 -0.056 -0.034
(0.112) (0.098) (0.059) (0.045)
PERIPHER -0.274 -0.036 0.020 -0.050
(0.462) (0.405) (0.241) (0.165)
Constant 1.125 1.023 0.232 -0.951
R* 0.494 0.604 0.6C8 0.687
Adjusted R* 0.437 0.555 0.564 0.648
a Unstandardized Coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses
* Unstandardized Coefficient at least twice its standard
error
SANCTG67 = Sanctions* 1963-67 (log 10)
PR0TES67 = Protest Demonstrations* 1963-67 (I+lllog 10)
ENERGY65 = Energy Consumption* 1965 (log 10)
INE01965 = Income Inequality* circa 1965
PERIPHER = Periphery* circa 1965
SEMIPHER = Semi-periphery* circa 1965
EASTBLOC = Eastern Bloc Nations* 1965
SANDEN67 = SANCTG67/Population Density* 1965 (log 10)
PR0DEN67 = PR0TES67/Population Density* 1965 (log 10)
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that these cases just do not fit the general pattern
consistent with the rest of the cases*
The five outliers were deleted froai the sample and the
equation was reestimated* The correlation matrix was again
checked for problems of mult icoll ineari ty* Haitovsky's test
assured no severe mult icoil ineari ty (Chi-square = 5*627*
d*f*= 151* The estimates for the sample excluding the
outliers are reported in Table 2 {equation 2)* The R 2 for
the equation increases from 0*494 in equation 1 (with the
full samplel to 0*604 in equation 2* But more importantly*
we see that the same variables remain statistically
significant* The major change* however* is in the
coefficient for semi-periphery status CSEHIPhERl* The
unstandardized coefficient increases from 0*418 to 0*624 and
is now almost twice the standard error* Note that the
coefficients for energy consumption (ENERGY65I and
peripheral status IPERIPHER) are not significant in either
equation* In fact* the sign for peripheral status (PERIPHER)
is in the opposite direction than was expected* In sum*
these findings provide strong support for the conflict
argument that income inequality is a key determinant of
government repression*
Researchers involved in studies of political repression
have debated the rationale for controlling for the effect of
population size by standardizing events such as government
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sanctions and protest demonstrations* ftuller (1986) prefers
to standardize events like these while Meede argues that "It
makes little sense to standardize sanctions" (1986:439).
Since there is no consensus on this matter * 1 reestimated
the model once more in order to explore the effects of this
procedure. Government sanctions (log 10) and Protest
demonstrations (l+l]log 10) were standardized by 1965
population density (logged base 10 to correct for skewness).
Oata for population density were taken from the United
Nations* (1966=78-86) Statistical Yearbo ok. By this
procedure we not only control for population size but
territory as well.
Results for this analysis with the full sample size are
reported in column 3 of Table 2. No severe multicollineari ty
was detected (Chi-square = 6.40; d.f.= 15). Note that the R*
increases from 0.494 in equation 1 to 0.608 in equation 3.
In addition* all the explanatory variables are in the
predicted direction. However* like the estimates in equation
1 and 2* only protest demonstrations (PR0CEN67) (b - 0.8121*
Eastern Bloc status (EASTdLOC) (b = 0.460)* and income
inequality (INEQ1965) (b = 0.019) are significant.
The plot of standardized residuals was checked for
outliers. Canada* Chad* Venezuala and Puerto Rico turned
out to be extreme cases. To examine the effects of these
outliers on the estimates* the equation was reestimated
without the outliers. Since the sample size was smaller* I
*9
checked for mult icoll ineari ty again and no serious problem
was detected (Chi-square = 5*89; d.f. = 151* The regression
coefficients are reported in equation 4 of Table 2* As the
results indicate* the estimates remain fairly stable* With
the exception of peripheral status* all the variables are in
the predicted direction* Among the three key explanatory
variables of concern* only income inequality has a
significant effect on government sanctions*
Discussion of Findings
The most striking result of the analyses above are the
estimates for income inequality (INEQ1965)* The regression
coefficients for this variable are fairly robust across all
four equations* In relation to existing cross-national
research* this contradicts Williams and Timberlake's I1964J
analysis of income inequality and government repression*
Cf course there are a number of factors that may explain
this difference* Differences in time period* sample*
measurement error* and the like* However* I suspect that
there is something to be said about one point that has been
stressed throughout: the inappropriate use of political
exclusion in the analysis by Williams and Timberlake 119841.
While it would be worth investigating this by reestimating
their model* the income inequality data for the time period
of their analysis fi.e.* circa 1975) are not available* In
fact* due to unavailable data* they used the same inequality
data for circa 1965 that was used in this analysis* This is
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another reason to suspect their findings and possibly
explains the discrepency between the results of Williams and
Timberlake's (1964) analysis of inequality and repression
and those reported here*
The findings also suggest that although in the predicted
direction* economic development is not strongly related to
repression* Interestingly enough* one other cross—national
study (i.e.* Timberlake and Williams- 1984) that has
explored this relationship also found that economic
development had a negative but relatively weak effect on
government repression* This contradicts other research
(e.g.* Bollen* 1983* Bollen and Jackman* 1985) that supports
the hypothesis of a relationship between economic
development and political democracy*
World system position also has a relatively weak effect
on government repression* Like economic development, there
is some indication of support for the predicted effect of
semi-peripheral status* In fact* the results for world
system position are consistent with the argument* That is*
the estimates for semi-peripheral status are greater than
the estimates for peripheral status* However* the
coefficients are weak* indicating that the relationship is
not significant*
Recall that Timberlake and Williams (1984) found no
significant relationship between dependence and government
sanctions* However* the results in this analysis suggest
51
some support for the world-system argument* This is
consistent with the findings of Bollen 119631 and Bollen and
Jackman 119851 who present support for a negative
relationship between non-core status and political
democracy*
It may be appropriate here* to emphasize a point made by
Bollen and Jackman (1985:4441 that empirical support for the
world-system position/dependency effect on political
democracy/repression has been mixed* Specifically* various
cross-national studies have found that dependency (measured
by penetration of foreign capital! has no significant effect
on political democracy (Bollen* 1983r476! or repression
(Timberlake and Williams* 19841* tin the other hand* there is
consistent support for the world-system effect on political
democracy (Bollen* 1983. Bollen and Jackman* 19851*
Summary
The findings reported in this chapter basically support
the hypotheses derived from the three theoretical arguments*
With the exception of peripheral status* all estimates are
consistently in the predicted direction* However* income
inequality is the only key independent variable that appears
to have a strong effect on government repression*
CHAPTER, 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have attempted to assess the validitiy
of three different views of government repression- The aim
was to contribute to the rather fragmented researcn existing
in the area* Another intention of this thesis was to correct
for several shortcomings that characterize the limited
extant research on government repression* Due to limitations
in the data* this endeavor has been confined to analyzing
government repression for circa 1965. It has* in effect*
only scratched the surface of this topic* In spite of this*
it has helped remedy the concerns raised regarding previous
studies and hopefully contributed to an area of inquiry that
has received relatively scarce attention*
The discussion in this chapter will focus on some of the
implications of the findings reported* In order to put this
into perspective* it may be appropriate to consider some of
the implications of this thesis in relation to the objective
specified in Chapter 1* The first section will focus on
this* Next* is a discussion of some possible policy
implications that may be drawn from this contribution*
Finally* I conclude the chapter with suggestions regarding
53
the possible direction of future research in this area.
Theoretical Implications
As outlined in Chapter it this research was primarily
concerned with assessing the validity of three varying
perspectives on repression. In this regardt the results
provide strongest support for the conflict argument.
Government sanctioning appears to be one tool of repression
that is categorically applied in highly unequal conditions*
The implication is that highly polarized economic conditions
can indeed create an athmosphere of instability and
insecurity within the state apparatus (which is persumably
guided by the interests of the elite)* And as the logic of
the conflict argument suggests, this insecurity on the part
ot the state is manifested in the extent of repressive
activities undertaken*
At the same time* there is no indication that
economically developed countries are far less prone to use
repressive means than less developed nations* This
essentially contradicts the conventional wisdom of
modernization theory* In other words* uhile researchers have
shown that economic development may well promote political
democracy and "openess", it would be misleading to
generalize that government repression under these
circumstances would also therefore be minimal* Regarding
the impact of world system position* we see that although
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there is support that nations in the serai-periphery are more
repressive* this relationship is weak. This is also the case
with the periphery.
There is also a broader and perhaps more important
theoretical implication that can be drawn from this study*
This centers on the importance of structural factors in
explaining government repression. Like other studies* there
is strong support that structural factors are crucial
determinants of government repression and additional
research should emphasize these factors.
Some students of government repression {e.g.* McCamant*
19841 argue that theoretical perspectives like those
examined here cannot provide adequate explanations of
government repression. McCamant 11984) claims that any
model of government repression must focus on the central
role of the state. He views the perspectives examined here
as focusing "too much on society. The focus must be on what
is truly political* not social...** (1984:34). But we must
also recognize that what he prefers to consider "truly
political** does not exist in a vacuum. Instead* as this
study has shown* its manifestation is influenced by and
dependent on certain socio-economic factors as well. While
the intention here was in no way to develop a model of
government repression* it seems clear that any attempt to do
so cannot ignore the important implications of tnese
perspectives. Not doing so would severely undermine any
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comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon.
Policy Implications
Along with the theoretical concerns* it is imperative
that we recognize the significance of the structural factors
examined here and their relationship to repression* because
they provide us with possible solutions to the problem*
Currently* most efforts aimed at addressing this problem
focus on exposing such activities and then exerting public
pressure to eliminate them* Amnesty International (19841
suggests preventive and remedial measures to counter
activities such as torture and other inhuman treatment*
These measures range from official ratification and
declarations condeming such activities to developing a
systematic judicial system to combat such acts* Such
efforts are certainly invaluable* Tney also raise the
awareness of the general public and even inspire scholarly
research in the area* However* the success of such efforts
in curbing repression have been limited*
As this research indicates* structural factors have an
impact on the extent of repression* And since initiatives
such as those prescribed by Amnesty International 11984) do
not emphasize structural factors* it is no suprise why such
measures tend to be ineffective* To comprehend and counter
this phenomenon requires that we recognize the social
atmospnere in which repression exists* Consequently*
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constructive measures directed towards curbing repression
must incorporate structural factors*
Suggestions for Future Research
Finally* a few words about future empirical research in
the area* At this point* research on government repression
is dictated and still severely hindered by the availability
of data* As more {information and data become available*
future research must reevaluate the validity of the three
perspectives*
With regard to Government sanctioning* future research
must also be sensitive to the indirect and/or interaction
effects of key explanatory variables* For example* in spite
of the fact that this research did not support assertions of
the modernization and world system perspectives* it is
possible that economic development and world system position
may have indirect effects on repression* Futhermore* since
it is obvious from the results that the key independent
variables examined in this research are interrelated* future
research can certainly contribute by exploring the
significance of their interaction effects*
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APPENDIX I
Sample of Nations and Data
Sanct. Protest Ineq. Energy Density
tfiTfi
Australia
Canada
France
Italy
Japan
U. Kingdom
Denmark
Norway
U. S.
w. Germany
Netherlands
Sweden
Yugoslavia 1*
Semi-peri phei
E. Germany*
Argentina
Egypt
Hungary*
India
Kenya
Lebenon
Pakistan
Philippines
S. Africa
Spain
Turkey
Malaysia
Finland
Peru
Mexico
Sri Lanka
Bulgaria*
Venezuala
007
023
065
032
Oil
059
003
007
476
080
012
007
032
132
116
075
042
189
084
039
069
039
235
138
036
094
004
026
016
025
010
100
Periphery
Czechoslavakia* 037
Indonesia 2bt>
Poland* 083
Brazil 137
Iraq 085
013
016
031
027
013
046
001
012
786
086
004
001
000
001
030
005
000
106
001
002
046
021
017
046
014
020
000
001
005
000
001
001
001
037
01*
005
007
23.7 4795 02
25,1 7653 02
30.4 2951 90
30.9 1787 172
27.2 1783 267
23.5 5151 491
25.5 4172 111
22.2 3588 012
26.6 9201 021
30.3 4234 232
27.7 3271 371
21.3 4506 017
22.5 1192 077
16.9 5460 148
35.2 1341 008
31.1 0290 030
19.1 2812 109
35.2 0172 163
54.9 0124 017
45.1 0747 237
26.8 0090 111
37.1 0209 112
40.9 2716 015
26.7 1023 063
40.7 0348 15*
39.6 1204 077
32.9 2679 014
42.9 0588 009
36.7 0977 022
Z8»2 0114 175
18.8 2571 074
35.7 2974 010
17.4 5676 111
40.7 0111 072
21.2 3504 101
50.6 0347 010
49.8 0581 015
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Zimbabwe 206 040
Colombia 033 021
Chile 027 012
Thailand 028 000
Tunisia 018 003
Panama 021 018
Equador 033 012
Uganda 058 000
Tanzania 067 002
Uruguay 016 003
Hondorus 010 000
Costa Rica 002 000
Zambia 044 000
Puerto Rico 005 005
El Salvador 001 000
Jamaica 008 000
Senegal 022 002
Sierra Leone 027 000
Benin 019 Oil
Ivory Coast 016 000
Chad 008 000
New Zealand 001 012
Madagascar 002 000
Mean 59.2 25.9
Standard Dev. 81-5 101.8
Range 475.0 786.0
56.9 0651 Oil
44.4 0532 016
34.8 1089 012
42.6 0110 061
37.3 0200 027
32.2 1115 017
56.6 0212 019
30.7 0042 033
41.6 0103 022
30.4 0916 015
50.0 0396 021
39.5 0306 029
44.0 0487 005
33.6 2125 300
33.0 0168 142
43.8 0887 168
47.8 0145 018
37.8 0068 033
39.3 0040 021
41.5 0152 012
30.7 0015 003
25.4 2530 010
48.6 0042 012
34.7 1721.2 78.8
10.1 2042.8 99.0
40.0 9186.0 489.0
* Eastern bloc nations
Sanct. = Total Sanctions 1963-67
Protest = Total Protest Demonstrations 1963-67
Ineq. = Income Inequality circa 1965
Energy = Per Capita Energy Consumption 1965
Density = Population per square kilometre of area 1965
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ABSTRACT
Considerable cross-national research has focused on the
nature and structure of governments. Part of this research
has centered on identifying the structural determinants of
government repression* This latter body of research has been
guided by three distinct theoretical perspectives: 11 the
Marxian fconflictl perspective* (2) the modernization
perspective* and 131 the dependency/world system
perspective*
Proponents of the Marxian conflict perspective emphasize
economic inequality as a major determinant of government
repression* Proponents of the modernization perspective
claim that economic development is crucial to increased
political freedom* implying that as a nation develops
government repression will decline* Dependency/world system
theorists* on the other hand* argue that position in the
world economic system is a key determinant of the political
structure of nations and tnat nations in dependent positions
tend to be more repressive*
Existing tests of these perspectives are limited and
inconclusive* Further* cross-national researchers have
failed to assess the validity of all three explanations
simultaneously* I remedied this deficiency* Specifically* I
used ordinary least-squares (OLSI regression to assess the
effects of income inequality* economic development* world
system position and several control variables I number of
protest demonstrations and Eastern bloc status! on a measure
of government repression (government sanctions) for circa
1965* Results suggest strongest support for the Marxian
conflict perspective*
